In an attempt to respond to the needs of the country's poor, the Indian government launched an ambitious workfare scheme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in 2005, which guaranteed hundred days of employment in unskilled manual labour at a minimum wage to every rural household each year. The book assesses the effectiveness of formal and informal mechanisms-political representation, community social audits, access to information, membership in networks, political competition-in reducing corrupt practices and enabling NREGA to reach its intended beneficiaries in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The book tests several intuitions and finds that, among other things, political representation for scheduled castes and tribes, and women has produced dividends in the form of higher participation and higher earnings in the scheme by these groups. Low access to information, on the other hand, has hindered the effective functioning of these mechanisms. Written in non-technical language, it is one of the few studies of its kind that blends econometric and ethnographic analyses towards a better understanding of the effective implementation of the scheme.

The book assesses the effectiveness of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), initiated by the Indian government in 2005, in reaching its intended beneficiaries-the rural poor-in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu. Applying a cross-disciplinary approach, it positions the implementation of NREGA within the larger context of corruption, poverty alleviation, political representation of vulnerable groups, access to information, and community social audits within which it functions.